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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS
UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(8)
INTRODUCTION
On June 7, 1973, an automobile carrying five high school
students collided with a semi-tractor truck. Following normal
procedure in the aftermath of such accidents, the state high-
way patrol compiled a police accident report. In a negligence
action brought against the truck driver,I the defense attempted
to introquce the police report as evidence on the issue of re-
sponsibility2 and the plaintiff objected on hearsay grounds.
Specifically at issue was the admissibility of the portions of the
report containing the statement of the defendant truck driver3
and the officer's conclusions concerning fault for the acci-
dent-that the plaintiff's car had "entered the intersection
against a red light."4 The district court admitted the report,
and in Baker v. Elcona Homes Corporation the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling.5
In affirming the district court ruling the Sixth Circuit'
concluded that the police accident report was admissible in its
Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1978).
The truck driver was unable to provide viable testimony on the issue of fault
because he was blinded by the sun at the moment of impact. The only surviving
plaintiff had no recollection of the collision. Id.
Both parties extensively questioned the highway patrolman about the factual data
contained in his report (e.g., the physical conditions at the scene of the accident and
the patrolman's use of vector analysis to ascertain the point of impact). The parties
did not question the patrolman as to his opinion on the issue of who had the right of
way. After the patrolman left the stand, the defense introduced the report. Id. at 554-
55.
, Id. at 555 n.3. The defendant testified that he could not see the color of the traffic
light because the sun was in his eyes. He further testified that traffic opposite him on
the same highway had not stopped and that he did not see any cross traffic other than
the plaintiff's car.
4Id.
I Id. at 555-56. The district court admitted the report as a recorded recollection
under FED. R. EVID. 803(5). The Sixth Circuit held that reliance on Rule 803(5) was
inappropriate, id. at 555 n.4, and ruled that the report was "more properly admissible
as a public record under FED. R. Evm. 803(8)." Id. at 556.
1 Kentucky law does not comport with the Sixth Circuit ruling, at least to the
extent that Kentucky does not recognize the admissibility of police reports. See Camp-
bell v. Markham, 426 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. 1968); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d
426 (Ky. 1956); R. LAwsON, KENTUcKY EVDENcE LAw HANDBOOK 173 (1976).
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entirety under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 803(8), the
public records and reports exception to the hearsay rule. The
court reasoned that the officer's conclusion on the issue of who
ran the red light was a "factual finding" within the meaning
of FRE 803(8)(C),I even though his conclusion was based solely
on subsequent observation of the scene and on the comments
of the defendant. This interpretation of FRE 803(8)(C), how-
ever, does not meet with unanimous agreement. Others have
defined the phrase "factual findings" more narrowly so as to
include only the statements made on the official's personal
knowledge and observation.'
Should opinions and conclusions contained in reports of
official investigations be admissible in civil proceedings regard-
less of the absence of personal observation by the official who
conducted the investigation and submitted the report? Should
such conclusions be excised from the reports before they are
admitted? Or should the court require the presence of the re-
porting official to afford the jury both the opportunity to ob-
serve the official's demeanor during questioning and to scruti-
nize his explanation of the report's contents? This comment
will explore arguments on both sides of these issues and will
ultimately suggest a compromise. In order to balance the pub-
lic's interest in protecting the rights of the party opposing ad-
mission of the report and the public's concomitant interest in
the efficient use of both relevant evidence and public officials'
time, stringent safeguards must be established for the determi-
nation of admissibility of evaluative reports. While admissibil-
FED. R. EVID. 803(8) provides for the admissibility of the following:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or
(B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness (emphasis added).
The rule is referred to, interchangeably, as the official statements, the official records
and reports, or the public records and reports exception to the hearsay rule.
8 588 F.2d at 556.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, NOTE TO RuLE 803(8), H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7088.
[Vol. 68
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ity should not be presumed, the proponents of evaluative re-
ports should be able to gain admissibility by satisfying certain
procedural safeguards discussed in this comment.
I. THE OFFICIAL WRITTEN STATEMENTS EXCEPTION To THE
HEARSAY RULE
The hearsay rule generally prohibits the use in court of an
out-of-court statement to prove the truth of the fact asserted,'0
but certain exceptions have developed." The official state-
ments exception recognizes the inconvenience and disruption
of official functions that would result if reporting officials were
uniformly required to testify to the authenticity and accuracy
of routine reports. 2 Since such reports generally contain noth-
ing questionable or controversial it has been deemed reasona-
ble to dispense with a cross-examination requirement in favor
of preventing disruption of official duties. Similarly, the busi-
ness records exception' 3 prevents disruption of business affairs
when routine and regularly kept records are at issue.
A. Development of the Official Written Statements
Exception
The official written statements exception to the hearsay
rule exists in common law" and has been codified in both
state5 and federal'6 statutes. The development of the exception
has paralleled the development of the business records excep-
,0 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1361 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter 5 WIGMORE].
" Exceptions have developed to "accommodate between the tribunal's desire to
use all information that has probative worth ... and its desire to receive evidence
under the ideal condition of cross-examinations." R. LAWSON, KENTUcKY EVIDENCE LAW
HANDBOOK 120 (1976).
12 5 WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 1631.
13 FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
" See, e.g., Tomlin v. Beto, 377 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1967); Vanadium Corp. v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 159 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1947); Commonwealth v. Slavski,
140 N.E. 465, 468 (Mass. 1923).
11 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-1134 (1972); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.42 (Page
1971); W.VA. CODE § 57-1-7b (1957).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1733(a) (Supp. 1979). This section was amended in 1975 to clarify
that it "does not apply to cases, actions, and proceedings to which the Federal Rules
of Evidence apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1733(c) (Supp. 1979).
1979-80]
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tion' 7 and both are premised on the principles of necessity'8 and
trustworthiness. 9 In the case of the official written statements
exception, i.e., public records and reports, expediency provides
the element of necessity. Testimony from official sources is so
regularly required in trials that, without such an exception,
countless officials would spend more time testifying in court
than performing the functions of their offices, and the public
would suffer as a result. 0 In addition, official statements are
considered inherently trustworthy because they are kept sys-
tematically and routinely. Further evidence of their trustwor-
thiness rests in the declarant's official duty to make the record
or report and in the "presumption" that public officials accu-
rately and competently perform their duties.2' It is further
,1 FED. R. EvID. 803(6). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (Supp. 1979), which is the
business records counterpart to § 1733, the codification of the official records excep-
tion. The two exceptions share common law origins but are not completely parallel.
Specifically, four common law elements of the regularly kept records exception have
been incorporated and adapted in the evolution of the official statements exception.
First, to be admissible, a business record must have been made in the "regular course
of business" by an entrant having a "duty" to record the information correctly. 5
WIGMORE § 1523; 4 I. WEINSTEI & M. BURGER, WEINSTEIN's EViDENCE 803-144 (1977)
[hereinafter 4 WEINSTEIN]. Similarly, an official report must have been made by one
under a duty to record or report certain information. 5 WIGMORE § 1633(4). Second, at
common law, both the business and official records exceptions required that the en-
trant have personal knowledge of the fact chronicled. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVMENCE
§§ 310, 315 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter McCoRMicK]. Personal knowledge of the entrant
is no longer necessary under either exception; the requirement is satisfied if the person
supplying the information has personal knowledge and a duty to report such informa-
tion to the entrant. 4 WEINSTEIN at 803-148, 803-152. The third common law element
under both exceptions was that either the informant or the entrant be available as a
witness. 5 WIGMORE § 1521. FED. R. Evm. 803(6) and 803(8) make unavailability imma-
terial-necessity for admitting the records or reports is premised on other considera-
tions. The fourth common law element, contemporaneity, is still a viable requirement
for admissibility of business records. Business entries must be made at or near the time
of the event or transaction recorded. 5 WIGMoRE § 1526. The official statement excep-
tion differs on this point. With the expansion of the official statements exception by
adoption of FED. R. Evm. 803(8), the need for contemporaneity was removed. See 4
WEINSTEIN at 803-173.
"1 5 WIGMORE, supra note 10, at §§ 1521 & 1631.
1 Id.
10 Id. at § 1631. See also Wallace, Official Written Statements, 46 IowA L. Rxv.
256, 258 (1961).
22 5 WIGMORE § 1632. See also McCoRMICK, supra note 17, at § 315.
Some English judges have suggested that the fact that an official record is open
to public scrutiny adds to the probability of reliability and is an essential element in
the exception. Wigmore, however, considers this circumstance as "merely a casual
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believed that a written statement will be more reliable than
an official's memory given the volume and repetitiveness of
the business he conducts for the public."2
B. The Evaluative Reports Controversy
Three types of official statements are admissible under the
public records and reports exception as embodied in FRE
803(8). First, records of "the activities of the office or agency"'
are admissible under subsection A. Subsection B allows official
reports entered pursuant to a legal duty to observe and report
such matters.24 Subsections A and B apply to routine official
reports; the controversy arises with the third type of official
statement as defined in subsection C. Subsection C allows as
evidence in some cases "factual findings resulting from an in-
vestigation made pursuant to authority granted by law
"25
The term "factual findings" is subject to varying interpre-
tations which have resulted in the controversy concerning the
admissibility of evaluative reports. If a "factual finding" is
nothing more than the reporting official's observation of physi-
cal conditions, there is little objection to the production of his
notation in evidence. However, if, as some contend, subsection
C also embraces evaluations of the statements and observa-
tions of bystanders or the official's own conclusions, it is possi-
ble that evidence will be admitted which "could present an
opportunity for a miscarriage of justice" 26 in that an inaccurate
advantage, and not an essential limitation" on the admissibility of official statements.
5 WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 1632.
2 MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at § 315.
z This is an embodiment of the common law rule. E.g., Howard v. Perrin, 200
U.S. 71 (1906) (General Land Office records); Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Co. v.
United States, 250 U.S. 123 (1919) (Treasury records of miscellaneous receipts and
disbursements).
11 Subsection B also codifies the common law rule and carries forward the impor-
tant concepts of 28 U.S.C. § 1733(a) (Supp. 1979). For the text of this statute see note
26 infra.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
' Wallace, supra note 20, at 265. 28 U.S.C. § 1733(a) (Supp. 1979), which gov-
erned admissibility of official records prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, circumvented this potential problem because it was much narrower in scope
and was limited exclusively to factual records. It provides: "Books or records of ac-
counts or minutes of proceedings of any department or agency of the United States
1979-80]
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or erroneous conclusion or opinion could seriously mislead the
jury.27
1. Advisory Committee Note: "Negative Factors"
The Advisory Committee's Note28 recognized the contro-
versy surrounding the evaluative report and suggested it might
be caused not only by differences in interpretation and princi-
ple but also by the wide variety of situations involved. While
the Advisory Committee stated that the rule "assumes admis-
sibility in the first instance but with ample provision for escape
if sufficient negative factors are present, ' 29 it also acknowl-
edged the difficulty in attempting to pinpoint an effective pro-
cedure for determining when "negative factors" would require
a report to be ruled inadmissible. 0
2. Legislative History: Inconclusive Conference Report
An examination of the legislative history is illuminating,
but it does not clarify Congress' underlying intent in promul-
gating 803(8)(C). The House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee reported that the term "factual findings" was to be
"strictly construed and that evaluations or opinions contained
in public reports shall not be admissible under this Rule."'3
The concurrent Senate Judiciary Committee Report 2 disa-
greed with the House version, contending that such a narrow
reading would contravene the intent of the Rule as stated in the
Advisory Committee's Note. The Senate Judiciary Committee
shall be admissible to prove the act, transaction or occurrence as a memorandum of
which the same were made or kept."
17 See generally Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930) for the proposition that
no opinions, conclusions or hearsay are admissible. In Johnson, a police accident report
containing opinions based on the observations of bystanders was excluded from evi-
dence. Accord, Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 175 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1949); Gencarella v.
Fyfe, 171 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1948); Davis' Admrs. v. Gordon, 216 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1948).
Is Notes of Advisory Committee on FED. R. EVID. 803(8), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A.
Federal Rules of Evidence 589-90 (1975).
2 Id. at 590.
" Id. For a discussion of the safeguards outlined in the Advisory Committee's
Note see notes 80-83 infra and accompanying text.
1, H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 9, at 7088.
'2 SEN. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE &
AD. NEWS. 7051.
[Vol. 68
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argued that the intent was to assume admissibility of evalua-
tive reports unless "the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. ' 33 The Judiciary
Committee believed that the Advisory Committee's Note fur-
nished sufficient guidance for determining whether trustwor-
thiness was so lacking that the report should not be admitted.3 4
The Congressional Conference Committee Report, 35
usually intended to be conclusive, does not resolve this dispute.
The Conference Committee rejected the Senate interpretation
of FRE 803(8)(C) on unrelated grounds36 and accepted the
House version containing the narrow interpretation of "factual
findings." The Conference Committee did not, however, ex-
plicitly treat the "factual findings" issue. One inference that
might be drawn from this incomplete resolution is that the
House version of the Rule prevails on all aspects. However, one
commentator has suggested that elimination of the Senate ver-
sion does not imply that the Conference Committee disagreed
with the Senate's liberal interpretation since no reference was
made to that issue in the report. 37 Proponents of both interpre-
tations can derive no greater support from the legislative his-
tory than that which may be gleaned by implication.
HI. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS
A. The Argument Against Admission
Opponents of the admissibility of evaluative reports pre-
sent four arguments in support of their position. First, they
propose that interpretation of opinions and conclusions in eval-
uative reports is essential to well-founded jury decisions and a
- Id. at 7064.
34 Id.
CONFERENCE REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws 7098.
11 Id. at 7104. The Senate Judiciary Committee had amended 803(8) to refer to
804(b)(5), a rule which was not enacted. Rule 804(b)(5) would have allowed reports
containing observations by law enforcement personnel against a criminal defendant
when the officer was "unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental
illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process." SEN. REP. No.
1277, supra note 32, at 7104.
11 Savikas, Business Records and Public Records Under Illinois Law and the New
Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 Cm. B. REc. 238, 244 (1976).
1979-80]
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fair adjudication of issues.3" Second, they argue that an exami-
nation of judicial precedent reveals that inadmissibility of
evaluative reports is the norm.39 Third, opponents claim that
the fact-opinion distinction is no more difficult to draw than
other differentiations jurists are continually required to make."
Finally, opponents contend that liberal admissibility of evalua-
tive reports misplaces the burden of proof and permits unwar-
ranted reliance on presumption of the official's competence.'
1. Interpretation is Essential
Those opposing the admissibility of evaluative reports con-
tend that interpretation of opinion, conjecture and conclusions
contained in evaluative reports must be provided by the re-
port's proponent.2 This need for interpretation is particularly
important "where opinion in the report is based not upon scien-
tific tests, but upon a multitude of facts, as in a report made
by a. . . policeman."43 The most effective method of providing
this interpretation is to question the reporting official on the
witness stand at trial. The party opposing introduction of the
" See notes 42-46 infra for a discussion of the need for interpretation.
12 See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the prevailing
case law.
,1 See notes 54-59 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the fact-opinion
distinction.
" See notes 60-62 infra and accompanying text for this discussion.
,2 One commentator has suggested that interpretation of evaluative reports is
essential since:
[E]qually qualified experts in the field will often reach conflicting opinions
on the very same facts. Precedent and principle compel the conclusion that
there is too great a likelihood that a lay trier of fact vill generally be unable
to determine the proper weight to assign to an evaluative opinion in a police
laboratory report if they do not have the opportunity to have the expert
cross-examined.
Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports
Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 639 (1979). See also Phillips v.
Neal, 452 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1971), where the court indicated that opinions and conclu-
sions based on hearsay especially require interpretation when they could be outcome
determinative. See also Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 692, 705 (8th Cir. 1987)
where the court called for interpretation of conclusions regarding "the highly contro-
versial ultimate issue" of the case.
11 Comment, Evaluative Reports by Public Officials-Admissible As Official
Statements? 30 TEx. L. REv. 112 (1951). But see Imwinkelried, supra note 42, who
argues that even scientific tests lack the requisite certainty and reliability. He advo-
cates limited admissibility of such test results, particularly in criminal trials.
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report would then be able to cross-examine the official about
his methods of observation and recordation, about the condi-
tions under which he received and recorded the statements of
bystanders or parties to the incident and his basis for evaluat-
ing them, and about the basis for any inferences and conclu-
sions drawn. The cross-examination would give the jury the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the official as he de-
scribes his investigatory technique and responds to probing
inquiries about the efficacy of that technique. Opponents argue
that the testimony of the reporting witness will provide a more
comprehensive foundation of knowledge upon which the jury
can make its decisions," and that providing such a basis for
well-founded jury decisions is the only effective way to allay the
danger of the jury's giving too much weight to the official writ-
ten documents when presented alone.45 The opponents argue
that it is insufficient to allow the adverse party to rebut the
document later since a prima facie case has been made against
him and since juror opinions likely will be formed before he can
offer any rebuttal."
2. Prevailing Case Law
As indicated in the Advisory Committee's Note,47 many
cases have reviewed the admissibility of evaluative reports.
While a few types of these reports are statutorily singled out
for admission," the prevailing case law indicates that rejection
of evaluative reports is the norm,49 evincing a judicial distrust
of such reports.
11 It has been suggested that allowing the opposing party to call and examine the
official as his own witness would be an adequate solution to this problem. Comment,
supra note 43, at 177. This solution is neither adequate nor equitable. The burden
should be on the proponent to establish the validity of the report. See also Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. Cleveland's Adm'r., 11 S.W.2d 434, 435-36 (Ky. 1928) which also
discusses the possibility of calling the official to impeach the report.
41 Phillips v. Neal, 452 F.2d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1971).
11 Id. at 348.
1 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 28, at 589. See Comment, supra note
43, for a discussion of the types of evaluative reports which have been the subject of
controversy.
11 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 28, at 590. Fm. R. Evm. 802 ensures
that these statutes will be unaffected by a narrow interpretation of 803(8)(C).
," Wallace, supra note 20, at 265. See, e.g., Teng v. Dulles, 229 F.2d 244, 246 (2d
Cir. 1956); Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co., 141 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1944).
1979-80]
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Decisions holding inadmissible reports containing state-
ments about the cause of or responsibility for an incident 0 are
generally premised on one of two lines of reasoning. Courts
ruling such reports inadmissible do so either because the lack
of personal knowledge defeats admissibility of the report-' or
because opinions and conclusions of non-expert witnesses are
usually inadmissible as invasions of the province of the jury.52
Testimony of non-experts is confined to factual statements un-
less it can only be presented to the jury in opinion form. In that
instance, testimony must be based on the witness' personal
observation and must be essential to the jury's clear under-
standing of the total testimony."
3. The Fact-Opinion Distinction
Opponents of the admissibility of evaluative reports dis-
miss the proponents' argument that all evaluative reports
should be admitted since fact and opinion are too often diffi-
cult to distinguish. Opponents' counter argument is that the
"difference between a 'fact'. . . and an 'opinion' is one of the
fundamental differences in the law of evidence."54 While propo-
nents have suggested that the fact-opinion distinction is noth-
ing more than an intellectual debate since the same reports
could be admitted under FRE 803(6), 51 opponents to admissi-
50 E.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir. 1969);
Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 692, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1967); Gencarella v. Fyfe,
171 F.2d 419, 421-22 (1st Cir. 1948).
5, E.g., Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 692, 705 (8th Cir. 1967); Hoel v.
City of Los Angeles, 288 P.2d 989, 997-98 (Cal. App. 2d 1955); Davis' Adm'rx. v.
Gordon, 216 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ky. 1948).
52 E.g., Hadley v. Ross, 154 P.2d 939, 942 (Okla. 1944).
1 FED. R. Evw. 701. See, e.g., Padgett v. Buxton-Smith Mercantile Co., 262 F.2d
39, 41 (10th Cir. 1958); Lewis v. W.T. Grant Co., 129 F. Supp. 805, 812 (S.D. W. Va.
1955). Should the official qualify as an expert in his field, FED. R. Evm. 702 allows
opinion testimony if it will assist the trier of fact. This situation existed in Baker v.
Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), where the highway patrolman
qualified to testify as an expert. The problem of opinion testimony is accentuated when
the opinion is presented to the jury in written form and there is no opportunity for
cross-examination.
1' Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
961 (1958).
55 FRE 803(6) expressly includes statements of opinion:
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
[Vol. 68
EVALUATIVE REPORTS
bility point out a judicial rejection of this argument." One
court has stated that even though there is an overlap of subject
matter between 803(6) and 803(8),
the United States Supreme Court has admonished us to read
statutes addressed to judicial specialists with appropriate
technical discrimination, . . . and to interpret a statutory
scheme with due respect to the whole and each of its provi-
sions as it manifests legislative purpose. .... This Court,
therefore, will not ascribe to Congress a willingness to add
mere surplusage to the Federal Rules of Evidence in the form
of 803(8), even though much of the matter admissible under
that provision may also be subsumed under 803(6). Thus,
since (8) deals explicitly with reports based on public investi-
gations, . . . this Court will look exclusively to (8) in deter-
mining the admissibility of the [public] report.51
Finally, opponents contend that where factual statements
based on personal knowledge can be severed from conclusions
and opinions, this separation should be effected to allow admis-
sion of the factual portion into evidence. 5 In fact, courts have
held it reversible error to admit the entire report when it con-
tained statements as to cause or responsibility for the acci-
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by,
a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown
by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph in-
cludes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit (emphasis added).
1, United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (Rule 803(6) held inapplicable to government records and reports).
1 Complaint of American Export Lines, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 454, 456 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). The court outlined two considerations for choosing between the conflicting
interpretations of FRE 803(8)(C). First, while FRE 803(8) and FRE 803(6) are similar,
FRE 803(8) omits the terms "opinions" and "diagnoses" and uses "factual findings."
Since these different terms are used in separate but similar contexts within the same
rule, the court assumed they have separate and distinct meanings. Second, the report
in question was written pursuant to a Coast Guard regulation which stipulated that
such reports were not to be used in litigation. The court deemed this to be the kind of
negative factor which the Advisory Committee suggested should weigh against the
evidentiary use of conclusions or opinions contained in an official report. Id. at 457-
58.
" E.g., Gencarella v. Fyfe, 171 F.2d 419, 422 (1st Cir. 1948).
1979-801
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dent. 9 This separation is often easily accomplished and per-
mits jury contemplation of the factual evidence free of contam-
ination from inadmissible hearsay and opinion. 0
4. Burden of Proof and Presumption of Competency
The liberal view of FRE 803(8)(C) impliedly places the
burden of showing a lack of trustworthiness on the adverse
party. 1 This view not only shifts the burden to the party with
less access to evidence on the issue, but it also permits the
proponent of the report to gain admission on the presumption
that the official was properly qualified to make such conclu-
sions.12 Opponents argue that this presumption of trustworthi-
ness of official reports is valid only to the extent that the re-
porter is competent. 3 Without direct questioning of his qualifi-
cations to apply the requisite skills of his job and of his ability
to analyze all factors, the fact finder will be unable to make the
most cogent determinations possible.
B. The Argument in Favor of Admissibility
Proponents of the admissibility of evaluative reports base
their argument on three primary contentions. First, evaluative
reports comply with the requirements of necessity and
trustworthiness,64 as do routine official reports. Second, the
very nature of a given report is difficult to determine since it
is impossible to draw a clear distinction between fact and opin-
11 Id. The court in Gencarella also held that cross-examination of the reporting
official as to portions of the report does not make the entire report admissible. Id. at
421-23.
10 Application of this principle in Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551 (6th
Cir. 1978), would have produced a much more satisfactory result. The court struggled
to justify its admission of conclusions based on the self-serving statements of the
defendant by declaring that such data was admissible under FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1)(B)
as a prior consistent statement which rehabilitated the witness after an accusation of
recent fabrication. The record fails to reveal any such accusation. Id. at 559. Since the
patrolman who had prepared the report had testified personally prior to the introduc-
tion of the report for its conclusion as to responsibility for the accident, a more reasona-
ble approach would have been to recall the official to the stand to deliver his opinion
and conclusion testimony personally.
I, Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 28, at 590.
62 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 803-181 (1977).
63 Comment, supra note 43, at 118.
11 See notes 68-74 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of these factors.
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ion. 5 Finally, the evidence contained in the reports is not con-
clusive. 6 In addition to compelling policy arguments favoring
admissibility, proponents argue that an examination of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the accompanying Advisory
Committee's Note suggests that admissibility of evaluative
reports is the intention underlying the Rule.67
1. Necessity and Trustworthiness
The special need for admission of evaluative reports, like
that for routine official statements, is the expediency of getting
the evidence before the fact finder without disrupting the func-
tions of the public official. 8 The jury must hear all available
evidence with probative value if it is to arrive at a knowledgea-
ble decision. At the same time, the public is entitled to efficient
productivity from its elected and appointed officials. Allowing
evaluative reports into evidence would alleviate the problem of
repeatedly calling officials away from their official duties.
According to advocates of their admissibility, several fac-
tors assure the trustworthiness of evaluative reports. Salient
among the factors is timeliness. 9 The official generally reaches
the accident or occurrence quickly and can, therefore, observe
physical evidence and interview participants and witnesses
before conditions change and perceptions dim. The importance
of timeliness is emphasized by studies showing that one's mem-
ory of events declines rapidly.70 An important consideration is
the need to preserve the memories of public officials; because
they prepare so many reports in the course of their duties, it is
probable an official will not remember a particular incident in
detail, if at all, by the time it reaches trial. In that situation,
11 See notes 75-77 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the fact-opinion
distinction.
11 See notes 78 & 79 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of
the evidence once admitted.
'7 See text accompanying note 50 supra for an explanation of this interpretation.
66 5 WIGMORE § 1631; MCCORMHCK, supra note 17, at 736.
69 McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wider Use of Reports of Official
Investigations?, 42 IowA L. Rav. 363, 364 (1957); Wallace, supra note 20, at 264.
10 Wallace, supra note 20, at 264. Wallace refers to BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 88
(1926) and BURTr, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 54, 86-88 (1931) for the idea that "[t]he details
of an occurrence are the subject of drastic memory reduction within the first few hours
and days after its occurrence."
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not only would the report be more accurate and reliable, but
calling the official to the witness stand would be a waste of
time. Additionally, the alacrity with which an official report is
made minimizes the opportunity for fabrication by parties, the
tendency of parties to rationalize the facts favorably to them-
selves and the opportunity for parties to try to persuade wit-
nesses of their version of the story.7' So far as hearsay is con-
cerned, 7 it is presumed that a skilled investigator would in-
clude information which was not based on personal knowledge
only after investigating sufficiently to convince himself of its
reliability. 3 Finally, proponents contend that "[t]he jury's
function should not be reduced by excluding relevant evidence
unless the court is reasonably assured that the result of the
litigation will be less reliable if the evidence is revealed to the
jury.274
2. The Fact-Opinion Distinction
Those favoring admission of evaluative reports argue that,
since distinction between fact and opinion is so elusive, evalua-
tive reports should be admitted into evidence regardless of the
presence of opinion or conclusion lest valuable evidence be lost
to the finder of fact.7 5
While the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated
that admissibility of a report to prove the opinion of an official
investigator is a matter of judicial discretion,76 the Third Cir-
cuit has declared unequivocally that official reports containing
11 Wallace, supra note 20, at 264. To Wallace "[t]hese considerations seem over-
whelmingly to support admissibility of the official statements involved." Id.
72 Part of the police report to which the plaintiff objected in Baker v. Elcona
Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), was the statement of the defendant regard-
ing his inference that he had the green light.
73 MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at 727-37. See also 4 WEMsZTEn at 803-204, who
argues: "[I]f the trial judge finds that the particular expert in question would not have
relied upon facts not directly observed by him unless he, in light of his experience,
knew them to be trustworthy, the investigative report should not be rejected on the
ground of lack of personal knowledge."
' 4 WEINSTEIN at 803-167.
7 Id. at 803-185. See McCoRMICK, supra note 17, at § 317, who suggests that
limiting admissibility of a report to the portions based on first hand observation is
inappropriate.
11 Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co., 141 F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir. 1944).
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opinions will be admitted into evidence. The Third Circuit held
that an official report is "no less admissible because it contains
conclusions of experts which are based on hearsay evidence as
well as upon observation. These conclusions, by virtue of ex-
press statutory provision, go to weight rather than to admissi-
bility. '77
3. The Report is Not Irrebuttable
Another point advanced by proponents is that an official
report does not, upon admission into evidence, become irrefut-
able; the evidence contained therein is in no way conclusive,
but is only considered prima facie evidence subject to rebut-
tal.7 8 Proponents also argue that there is no substance to the
argument that a jury would be unduly influenced by the au-
thoritative impact of the report of a public official since juries
have long been considered capable of making fine distinctions
and affording certain evidence more or less weight. Further-
more, those in favor of the admissibility of such reports assert
that in most cases, the problem of undue influence is not signif-
icant.7 1
" Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467, 473 (3d Cir. 1950). The
report in question was the result of a statutorily mandated investigation of a gas tank
explosion. The court noted: "[T]his Court has several times held that hospital records
are admissible under the statute and certainly medical diagnosis is no less a matter of
opinion based upon observation and perhaps hearsay than this report of the Bureau's
investigation." Id. Other decisions reinforce this position. See, e.g., Miller v. New York
Produce Exchange, 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1977), which pointed to the difficulty of
distinguishing fact from opinion when the opponent of official documents claimed they
were conclusory. The court found no error in the admission of the documents, stating
that "conclusory statements in an official or business report do not render it ipso facto
inadmissible . . . ." Id. at 769. See also United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971), which illustrates the complex justifications
courts are forced to make in this area. The court found no error in the failure to call
as a witness the lab technician who processed the latent palm print which was used
as evidence against the defendant. His report, according to the court, contained no
opinion because it was not an assertion offered to prove its truth. This finding was
contrasted with the report of the fingerprint expert who had identified the print as the
defendant's. That report contained a material assertion of the defendant's guilt, and
admission of the report without the expert's presence in court would have been error.
's Wallace, supra note 20, at 265.
T, See, e.g., United States v. School District of the City of Ferndale, Michigan,
577 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir.), rev'd on remand, 460 F. Supp. 352, 372 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
On appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction, the report of a Health, Education
and Welfare Department hearing examiner was held admissible under FED. R. EVID.
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4. Intent Underlying the Exception
The Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 803(S)(C) states
that the Rule "assumes admissibility [of evaluative reports]
in the first instance but with ample provision for escape if
sufficient negative factors are present."80 The Committee pro-
vides four factors to guide in determining trustworthiness of
evaluative reports: "(1) the timeliness of the investigation,.
(2) the special skill or experience of the official, . . . (3)
whether a hearing was held and the level at which conducted,
. .. [and] (4) possible motivation problems suggested by
Palmer v. Hoffman."8 ' The first three factors are self-
explanatory and the fourth refers to reports tainted by ulterior
motives, such as preparation of a report in anticipation of liti-
gation, as occurred in Hoffman."2 Aside from these factors,
other criteria could apply in specific situations.83 Proponents
argue that these guidelines provide ample protection against
indiscriminate use of untrustworthy evidence.
Those favoring admissibility argue that the refusal to
admit evaluative reports under 803(8)(C) would be completely
inconsistent with the similar business records exception,
803(6). That subsection specifically lists opinions as admissi-
ble, and courts have found that 803(8) "appears to overlap
rather than to diminish 803(6)."11 Proponents contend that
803(8)(C) even though it contained the examiner's conclusions that certain of the
defendant's actions constituted racial discrimination. Upon remand for trial on the
merits the examiner's conclusion was found to be "untenable." The expert opinion in
this case was not unduly influential.
0 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 28, at 590.
!Id.
318 U.S. 109 (1943). In Hoffman a railroad accident report was filed in accord-
ance with railroad company regulations by the employee responsible for filing it. The
report was found inadmissible nevertheless, since it was made with a view toward
litigation. It lacked circumstances of apparent trustworthiness. This case provides one
of the criteria for assuring the evidentiary validity of evaluative reports.
13 E.g., Florida Canal Indus., Inc. v. Rambo, 537 F.2d 200, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1976).
The court enunciated its own conditions for admissibility of evaluative reports:
(1) the records must be kept pursuant to some routine procedure designed
to assure their accuracy, (2) they must be created for motives that would
tend to assure accuracy (preparation for litigation for example, is not such a
motive), and (3) they must not themselves be mere culminations of hearsay
or uninformed opinion.
537 F.2d at 203.
" United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 968 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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since official reports can also be admitted under FRE 803(6),15
the debate over the interpretation of the phrase "factual find-
ings" in FRE 803(8)(C) is little more than an intellectual exer-
cise.
CONCLUSION
Both the arguments for and against the admissibility of
evaluative reports are premised on sound reasoning. A compro-
mise must be reached to ensure the efficient use of relevant
evidence and of public officials' time and to protect the party
opposing admission of the report. In short, the standard for
determination of admissibility must ensure fairness in both the
process and the result of the adjudication. Since interpretation
of evaluative reports is essential in many cases, the most equi-
table solution would be to admit the reports into evidence only
if they satisfy stringent safeguards."
First, the trial court judge must have broad discretion to
deny admission .of a report." The report, or any part of it,
should be excluded if the trial judge finds that its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue preju-
dice to the opponent or of misleading the jury.88 Additional
cause for excluding the report would be a finding by the judge
that "the officer's inspection of the objective facts and his in-
terviews of the eyewitnesses were too hasty and partial, or that
the data derived therefrom were too inconclusive to furnish an
adequate footing for the findings."8
Second, the offering party should have the burden of prov-
The Advisory Committee's Note implies that a "police report incorporating
information obtained from a bystander" is admissible under FRE 803(6). See notes of
the Advisory Committee on FED. R. Evm. 803(6), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. Federal Rules
of Evidence 586-89, 587 (1975).
11 See Florida Canal Indus., Inc. v. Rambo, 537 F.2d 200, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1976).
Some courts have devised their own conditions for admissibility of evaluative reports.
In the interest of uniform application of the law, a national standard should be set.
n "The search is for truth and the trial court is the first and best judge of whether
tendered evidence meets that standard of trustworthiness and reliability which will
entitle it to stand as evidence of an issuable fact, absent the test of cross-examination."
McCormick, supra note 69 at 367 (quoting Judge Murrah in Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co.,
141 F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir. 1944)).
R Wallace, supra note 20, at 265.
McCormick, supra note 69, at 369.
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ing the report's validity. 0 Since the trustworthiness of an eval-
uative report is contingent upon the competence of the official
who made the report, the proponent should have the affirma-
tive duty of proving to the court, prior to the report's admis-
sion, that the reporting official possessed adequate qualifica-
tions and that this particular investigation was performed com-
petently. To this end, the proponent should be required to
submit documentary evidence or direct testimony to the judge
to convince him of the official's competence.9'
Third, since there is no guarantee that a party will learn
during discovery that his opponent plans to introduce an evalu-
ative report at trial, the proponent's affirmative duty should
extend to require delivery of a copy 2 of the report, or notice
that one exists, to the adversary. This requirement would pre-
clude the problem of surprise at trial and would enable the
opposing party to utilize discovery to prepare his rebuttal.13
The offering party should be required upon the opponent's re-
quest and showing of good cause to produce the official for
direct and cross-examination at trial 4 or to prove actual una-
vailability of the official. The adverse party should not have
the burden of calling the official as a witness.
Another important safeguard will be the judge's instruc-
tion to the jury regarding the weight to be accorded the hear-
say, opinion and conclusions in the report and his warning to
the jury against substituting the official's conclusions for their
own. 5 In some cases even more might be necessary to empha-
size the gravity of this evidentiary problem to the jury. At least
one trial judge had the jurors sign statements that they under-
stood the use for which the evidence had been admitted and
the weight to be accorded it.9"
Utilization of these safeguards should result in fairness to
Comment, supra note 43, at 117.
Id. at 118.
92 McCormick, supra note 69, at 365.
13 See Savikas, supra note 37, at 245. This author asserts that such a procedure
for admitting evaluative reports would increase the importance of discovery in the
preparation for trial.
11 Comment, supra note 43, at 119.
'5 McCormick, supra note 69, at 369.
,' United States v. DeCarlo, 458 F.2d 358, 362 n.3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
843 (1972).
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all involved. While the safeguards outlined above might not
have changed the outcome in Baker v. Elcona Homes
Corporation, the result would have been based on a more sensi-
ble application of FRE 803(8). Perhaps the patrolman's conclu-
sions in the Elcona Homes case would have been admitted
anyway, but unless the proponent had complied with the nec-
essary safeguards he would have been required to elicit the
conclusions from the patrolman on the witness stand. In gen-
eral, these safeguards will result in a more uniform application
of FRE 803(8) and will make appellate review less of a specula-
tive venture. The proponent of an evaluative report will have
ample opportunity to introduce relevant evidence so long as
standards of reliability are met, and the opponent would be
protected against the introduction of unduly influential hear-
say and opinion. The work of public officials would be dis-
rupted by court appearances only when fairness so required.7
Kimberly K. Greene
97 McCormick, supra note 69, at 369. McCormick theorizes that liberalizing the
admissibility of official reports would result in more proficient investigating and re-
porting techniques, since officials would realize the likelihood that their reports would
be used in court.
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